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ABSTRACT 
 
With 10,5% women in parliament, Myanmar ranks number 157 out of 193 countries on the rate 
of women in parliament. This thesis aims at investigating the gendered institutions that 
influence women’s descriptive representation in politics through a case study on political 
recruitment within the Democratic Party for a New Society, DPNS, and their youth wing Youth 
for a New Society. The main research question of the thesis is how is political recruitment to 
and within the DPNS and YNS gendered? Parties are the key gatekeepers to political office and 
understanding the internal dynamics of one party contributes to the wider understanding of 
women’s underrepresentation and men’s overrepresentation in politics. This could make 
policies to change this pattern more effective. Interviews with DPNS party members have been 
analysed through the supply and demand model of political recruitment, with a feminist 
institutional approach. The analysis shows how informal institutions relating to supply and 
demand undermine political recruitment institutions that are supposed to favour women, such 
as a 30% gender quota. However, a women’s working committee is now trying to change this, 
mainly through establishing new formal institutions to counteract the informal institutions 
limiting women’s representation within the party.  
 
Key words: Burma, Myanmar, Candidate Selection, Feminist Institutionalism, Gender, 
Gender Quota, Party Policy, Political Recruitment, Representation, Supply and Demand  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With 10,5% women in parliament (GEN 2017: 10), which can be compared to the global 
average of 23,3%, Myanmar1 ranks number 157 out of 193 countries regarding their rate of 
female representatives (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017). Women’s political representation is 
included among the Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2018), and according to Phillips 
(1998: 224-237) equal representation is important for several reasons, with the key arguments 
being justice and interest. Myanmar has had a long-term military rule, but during recent years, 
vast political changes have taken place and the country now has a civilian government 
consisting of the party National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi as state 
counsellor, in place (Thawnghmung and Robinson 2017: 237). However, through the 
constitution from 2008, the military still holds power with 25% of the seats in parliament 
reserved for them, as well as the control over the ministries of defence, home affairs and border 
affairs (Williams 2011: 1202). A male historical legacy may set the rules of the game in the 
political sphere and parties have historically been dominated by men (Kenny and Verge 2016: 
359). In Myanmar the military has left its mark in society since it has made the public sector a 
male sphere (Maber 2014: 143) and few parties in Myanmar have policies that promote 
women’s representation among candidates or in internal party structures (PTE 2016: 4). One 
party that do have this is the Democratic Party for a New Society, DPNS. The party has a 30% 
gender quota since the early 2000’s which is aimed at both candidates and internal structures, 
but it has still not been reached in any of these instances. The newly organised Women’s 
Working Committee, WWC is trying to change this (Interviews 3 and 7). After many years in 
exile the party is now back in Myanmar and is going through a process of organising itself in 
the country (Interview 1), and this process could be seen as a form of institutional transition. In 
such moments, there might be larger possibilities for gender reforms, but there is also a risk 
that old gender norms live on (Kenny 2013: 45-46).  
 
To understand women’s underrepresentation and men’s dominance in politics, the party is an 
important unit of analysis. This is due to parties being the key gatekeepers to political office 
and candidate selection being an integral part of what parties do (Kenny and Verge 2016: 353). 
                                               
1 The official name Myanmar will be used in this thesis. The informants and the translators used both 
names and the name Burma will therefore be used in some quotes. 
 
 
 
 
 8  
 
To analyse this, the supply and demand model of political recruitment2, with a feminist 
institutional approach can be used. This model asserts the importance of factors both inside and 
outside of a party and their interaction for the representation of different groups of people in 
political bodies. The feminist institutional approach asserts a higher importance to the party and 
adds a focus on gendered formal and informal institutions3 within the supply and demand 
structure (Kenny 2013: 25-28). Both informal and formal institutions play their part in political 
recruitment and it is essential to see parties as gendered organisations (Bjarnegård and Kenny 
2016: 370). However, little research has been carried out on the topic of political recruitment 
with a gender perspective and how parties thereby influence women’s political representation 
(Kenny and Verge 2016: 353-354). Understanding gendered institutions is important to be able 
to work for a more gender equal political sphere (Lowndes 2014: 689).  
 
This thesis aims at investigating the gendered institutions that influence women’s descriptive 
representation in politics, with a specific focus on political recruitment and representation 
within the Democratic Party for a New Society and their youth wing Youth for a New Society, 
YNS. Descriptive representation4 refers to who is representing and which attributes this person 
has (Franceschet et al. 2012: 7-8).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2 Three important concepts used in this thesis are candidate selection, party recruitment and political 
recruitment. I use them in the following manner: candidate selection, quite straightforwardly relates to the 
selection of candidates to stand in elections for political office. Party recruitment refers to the recruitment 
of more members to the party, and internal recruitment and representation. Political recruitment refers to 
both candidate selection and party recruitment.  
3 Institutions are the rules of the game that structure political and social life. Formal institutions can for 
example be legal frameworks, whereas informal institutions among other things can be norms (Krook and 
Mackay 2011: 11). See an elaborated definition in the theory chapter.  
4 Other types of representation are substantive representation and symbolic representation. Substantive 
representation treats whether or not women are able to represent the interests of women and achieve 
political results. Symbolic representation relates to how constituents’ perceptions and beliefs are affected 
by women’s presence in political office (Franceschet et al. 2012: 8-9). Henceforth when only representation 
is mentioned, this refers to descriptive representation.  
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Through a case study, using the theory of demand and supply for political recruitment with a 
feminist institutional approach, I seek to answer the following research question: 
 
How is political recruitment to and within the DPNS and YNS gendered?  
 
And the sub-questions:  
 
In what ways are gendered institutions and their interaction limiting and enabling women’s 
representation in the party?  
 
How do actors within the party relate to and use institutions related to political recruitment?  
 
1.1 DE-LIMITATION 
There are of course many important aspects relating to political representation that do not fit 
within the scope of this thesis. Some intersectional aspects to look further into would for 
example be ethnicity, class and age. Also, the effect of gender quotas, and how women are able 
to influence the political agenda once they have entered the political sphere are aspects not 
covered in this thesis.  
 
1.2 THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis starts out with describing women’s political representation in Myanmar, how 
political parties in the country function and the background of DPNS. It continues with a theory 
chapter which describes feminist institutionalism and the supply and demand model of political 
recruitment and how this can contribute to the understanding of women’s underrepresentation 
in politics. From these perspectives an analytical framework is developed to be applied in the 
analysis. Following the theory chapter comes a chapter on methodology describing the choices 
made during the research process. Thereby the analytical model is applied to the case in an 
analysis and this is followed by the conclusion and suggestions for further research.    
 
2. BACKGROUND   
This chapter starts out with a description of the environment for women in politics in Myanmar, 
and the factors that lead to few women being politically active. This is followed by a description 
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of the nature of political parties in Myanmar, and thereafter the Democratic Party for a New 
Society is presented in relation to the political history of Myanmar since 1988.  
 
2.1 MYANMAR WOMEN IN POLITICS  
There has been a deep-rooted idea of Myanmar being a gender equal country, a discourse 
emerging in the colonial Myanmar (GEN 2015: 8; Than 2014: 1-2). This is further elaborated 
on by Zin Mar Aung (2015: 536-537) who states that the status of women in Myanmar was 
used as an argument amongst Indian and Myanmar nationalists “to discredit the British colonial 
project”. However, this is a simplified description. Historically, women in Myanmar often took 
care of the household budget. Despite this economic power, women has not reached as much 
political power since women were, and are, expected to take care of the household and thus the 
private sphere, whereas men the public, and thus political sphere (Loring 2018: 74-75). The 
description of Myanmar as a historically gender equal country has also been challenge by Than 
(2014) who claim that this notion does not take into account the many barriers that women face 
in political, social and economic life. According to Maber (2014: 145) legal systems may seem 
to give women and men equal rights, but cultural practices undermine this.  
When women are politically active, they are often expected to take on a supportive role (Loring 
2018: 76) and social norms regard women as unsuitable for leadership positions, lacking the 
qualities needed to be active in politics (Loring 2018: 80-81; Oxfam 2016: 5). Women that do 
engage in politics are in many ways challenged as it is a traditionally male sphere. They are 
questioned on behalf of their ability, and of not behaving in a feminine way. Women are taking 
part as leaders on community level and are involved in civil society, but it is harder for them to 
get access to formal and prestigious political roles (Maber 2014: 146-149). Furthermore, 
women may feel that they are unsuitable for positions of power as there is a lack of women in 
these positions (Oxfam 2016: 5).  
As mentioned in the introduction only a few parties have concrete policies for women’s 
representation within the party and as candidates. But even among those parties that have this, 
they generally do not fulfil them. And although many politicians support having more women 
in politics and also see that women have more constraints to enter politics, they do not support 
measures such as gender quotas (PTE 2016: 45). Many parties claim to have difficulties finding 
women, as they have less time to be engaged in politics (Loring 2018: 80).  
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Although more women were elected to parliament in the 2015 than in the 2011 election, the 
number of women in the government formed after the 2015 election actually decreased 
compared to the previous government, with Aung San Suu Kyi being the only woman in 
cabinet. On state and regional level 2 out of 14 chief ministers are women (Thawnghmung and 
Robinson 2017: 241-242). In the 2015 election 800 candidates out of 6039 were women. 
Although this is only 13%, it is still an increase from 2011 in which only 100 female candidates 
stood for election (The Carter Center 2016: 63). Although there exists a preference for male 
leaders in Myanmar (Loring 2018: 80-81), party preference is still stronger, and this voting 
behaviour leads to roughly the same percentage of women among the candidates as among the 
representatives (GEN 2017: 42). 13,6% of the elected seats were filled by women on union 
level and 12,7% on state/region level (GEN 2017: 11). However, as 25% of the seats are 
reserved for the military, the share of women as representatives sinks to 10,5% in the union 
Hluttaws5 and 9,7% in state and region Hluttaws when also these seats are included in the 
calculation. Out of the military MPs in union and state/region Hluttaws 4 out of 391 are women 
(GEN 2017: 11-12). 
 
2.2 POLITICAL PARTIES IN MYANMAR 
In 2015, there were 91 registered parties in Myanmar (Thawnghmung 2016: 133), of which 13 
are represented in the national parliament (Stokke et al. 2015: 29). They can roughly be divided 
into parties with connections to the military and pro-democracy parties. This last category 
constitutes both of nationwide and ethnic-centred parties (Stokke et al. 2015: 20-21). Parties in 
Myanmar are generally hierarchical. Top-down steering from the central part leads down to 
region/states and townships and information is transmitted from the top level in the form of 
instructions to the lower levels of the party. However, there is also a disconnect between central 
parts of the parties and their regional branches and difficulties to deal with different opinions 
within the parties which leads to fragmentation (Kempel et al. 2015: 16). According to Stokke 
et al. (2015: 22) the fact that many parties are new or have not been active within Myanmar for 
a long time during military rule leads to weak party structures.  
                                               
5 A Hluttaw is a parliament in Myanmar. The union parliament is bicameral and consists of the Amyotha 
Hluttaw, which is the upper house, and the Pyithu Hluttaw which is the lower house. Together they form 
the assembly of the union: the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Open Hluttaw 2018). 
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Township party offices have a high autonomy concerning candidate selection. Normally the 
township office compiles a list of preferred candidates which is sent to the state/region who 
makes the final selection. The leadership of the party will then make the conclusive decision. 
There is a preference for educated people with knowledge of politics (Kempel et al. 2015: 27). 
Candidates in all parties must fulfil certain requirements, such as citizenship and age 
requirements. Also, the candidates must have been living in Myanmar for at least 10 
consecutive years prior to the election and they must pay a registration fee of 300 0006 Kyat 
(The Carter Center 2016: 38-39). The registration fee is not always paid by the parties, which 
is problematic for candidates with low incomes and it may specifically be a problem for women 
as they generally have lower incomes than men in Myanmar (GEN 2017: 38). The 10-year 
requirement creates problems for DPNS, since many of its members spent much of the time 
from the early 1990’s to 2013 in exile (Interviews 7 and 8).  
2.2.1 Democratic Party for a New Society 
The Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS) does not have any representation in 
parliament, but it has adopted a gender quota of 30% (Interview 1), which only a few parties in 
Myanmar have done (PTE 2016: 4). The quota was adopted in the early 2000’s and applies to 
both candidates and to leadership bodies within the party (Interviews 7 and 8). However, it has 
not been reached in any of these instances yet. In their central leading committee there is 1 
woman out of 7 members which is 14%. In the central organising committee 8 out of 31 are 
women, or 26% (DPNS 2018a; DPNS 2018b). In the 2015 election 5 of their 21 candidates 
were women which is 24% (Interview 1). At the end of 2017, a women’s working committee 
(WWC) was formed with the aim of creating a women’s wing by the second half of 2018. This 
committee has come up with an array of suggestions on how the party can improve its 
representation of women (Interviews 1, 3 and 7).  
 
The party has its background in the student movement of 1988 (Fredholm 1993: 233), in which 
students demanded that the one-party rule be replaced by a multiparty democracy (Kipgen 
2016: 64). At this time also the now largest party of the country was formed: National League 
for Democracy, NLD (Fink 2001: 63), and one of the most prominent organisations at the time 
was the All Burma Federation of Students’ Unions, ABFSU, which later was to form DPNS. A 
                                               
6 Around 220USD in April 2018. The sum can also be compared to the salary of a member of the union 
parliament which is 1 000 000 Kyat (Egreteau 2017: 26).  
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crackdown on the movement in 1988 forced many of the students to flee to the border areas of 
Thailand, China, Bangladesh and India. There they formed the All Burma Student Democratic 
Front, ABSDF, which became a militant group, forming part of the armed struggle against the 
military regime. However, some stayed in Myanmar, among them Moe Thee Zun, leader of the 
ABFSU. He together with others from that organisation formed the DPNS on the 13th of 
October 1988 (Fredholm 1993: 231-233). The purpose of the party was to work for elections to 
be held. They also arranged political education and focused on farmers rights (Fink 2001: 64; 
Kipgen 2016: 129).  
 
At the time of the 1990 election, DPNS was the second largest party in the country, but did not 
candidate and instead chose to support NLD (DPNS 2018c). In the aftermaths of this election, 
which was won overwhelmingly by NLD, the military ignored the results and imprisoned and 
forced the leaders of NLD into exile (Stokke et al. 2015: 13-14). Also members from other 
parties were affected, and the entire leadership of DPNS were imprisoned as well (Amnesty 
International 1990: 1; Kipgen 2016: 63) As some also went into exile, the DPNS-movement 
however continued in Mae Sot in Thailand on the border to Myanmar (DPNS 2018c; Kyaw Yin 
Hlaing 2004: 411). There, the party started to collaborate with ABSDF, and also the Network 
for Democracy and Development and among other things arranged political capacity-building 
and provided a forum for discussing the developments in Myanmar. DPNS, in contrary to 
ABSDF, dissociated itself from the armed struggle (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004: 411-412).  
 
Myanmar was ruled by a military regime until 2011, when the Union Solidarity and 
Development Party, USDP, which is a party with close connections to the military took over 
power. They won the 2010 election, which was boycotted by NLD (Croissant and Kamerling 
2013: 119-121). However, after the 2015 election, in which NLD participated, NLD was able 
to form government (Thawnghmung and Robinson 2017: 237). During these years, the political 
landscape eased up with increased political space (Thawnghmung 2016: 133) and after DPNS 
was removed from the military’s list of unlawful associations in 2013, the party returned and 
re-registered in Myanmar in 2014 (DPNS 2018c). They are currently working on formalising 
and developing the organisation of the party (Interview 1). In the 2015 election they participated 
with 21 candidates, but did not win any seats (DPNS 2015; Interview 1). They see themselves 
as a social democratic/liberal party, with its roots in the activist movement (Interview 1) and 
are collaborating with social democratic parties from other countries. Also, they have close ties 
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to a youth empowerment school in Yangon to which the Swedish Social Democratic Youth 
League7 are affiliated. This school informally functions as a recruitment base for the party, just 
as the school in Mae Sot used to do. The party also has a youth wing, Youth for a New Society, 
YNS, which was originally established in 2002, but was reorganised in 2012 (YNS 2015).  
 
3. THEORY 
This chapter starts out with describing the overarching theory guiding this thesis: the feminist 
institutionalism, and then continues by explaining how this theoretical perspective can be useful 
to add to the supply and demand model of political recruitment. The chapter ends with an 
elaboration of an analytical framework to be used in the analysis of this thesis.  
 
3.1 FEMINIST INSTITUTIONALISM 
Feminist institutionalism combines the fields of new institutionalism and feminist political 
science (Mackay 2011: 181). March and Olsen (1984: 747) made the case for a new 
institutionalism, arguing that to understand politics, the organisation of it matters. The new 
institutionalism asserts the importance of both formal and informal institutions, meaning that 
they and their interaction shape political life. The approach puts institutions at the centre of the 
analysis, seeing how actors relate to them (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 1-10). Institutions are 
the informal and formal ways in which politics is formed and they constitute rules which guide 
people’s actions (Mackay 2011: 181-183). The informal institutions are in this thesis defined 
as rules that are recognized and collectively agreed upon, either explicitly or implicitly, but not 
formally. These rules, if broken are sanctioned in one way or another and thereby enforced 
(Lowndes 2014: 686) and could for example be norms and conventions (Kenny 2013: 36). Just 
as the informal institutions, formal ones are also enforced, but they are also formally agreed 
upon and in written language. These could for example be laws, regulations, standards and 
policies (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 52-53). However, instead of focusing on the distinction 
between formal and informal, it should also be acknowledged that there is a scale of how formal 
or informal an institution is. Informal institutions within parties may function as formal ones, 
and formal institutions are not automatically adhered to (Kenny 2013: 29), although there are 
enforcement mechanisms in place (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 46).  
                                               
7 Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbund, SSU.  
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The feminist take on the new institutionalism adds a gender perspective and examines how 
different formal and informal institutions are gendered, creating gendered outcomes and 
distribute power (Lowndes 2014: 685-686). Mackay (2011: 182) argues that “gendered 
institutions are crucial for understanding power inequalities and public and political life”. There 
are different versions of feminist institutionalism, but there are some common traits for the 
different approaches. Institutions are seen as inherently gendered, producing different outcomes 
for men and for women, and this also affects how power is constructed and how different 
institutions affect one another. Researching gender quotas, Freidenvall and Krook (2011: 50) 
argue that focus should be put on the interaction between different institutions as “the effects 
of one institution may depend on the shape of other institutions”. Informal rules influence the 
way formal rules are shaped, but they may also circumvent existing formal rules, such as gender 
quotas, and fill in the gaps where formal rules are missing (Mackay 2011: 181-183).  
 
Institutions can be both directly gendered, such as gender quotas, or indirectly when they are 
influenced by informal gender norms (Lowndes 2014: 687), which for example can be seen in 
how first-past-the-post systems tend to favour men (Krook 2010a: 712). This is echoed in 
Beckwith’s (2005) definition of gender as a process as ”[r]esearch employing gender as process 
centres on the idea that institutions and structures are themselves gendered and have differential 
implications for women and for men” (Beckwith 2005: 133). Gender as a process means that 
institutions that do not seem to be gendered still create gendered outcomes, but also that actors 
try to masculinize or feminize political institutions in a strategic way (Beckwith 2005: 132-
133).  
 
3.1.1 Change  
Change is a central concept to feminist institutionalism. At times of transitions there might 
occur wider opportunities for gender reform, but old gender norms can also be cemented 
(Kenny 2013: 45) as new institutions are formed by previous ones, both through external and 
internal processes (Chappell 2011: 164-165). This means that the practical functioning of new 
formal institutions might not be aligned with the intentions of the creators of the institutions 
(Kenny 2013: 47; Thelen 2003: 230). The gender norms might be covert and both them and 
their enforcement can go unnoticed, but once noted they can be contested by formal means such 
as quotas and women’s policy agencies (Chappell 2011: 165). Although existing institutions 
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can be restraining, actors also use them to achieve change (Mackay 2011: 186). This is an 
ongoing process, which often include strategic actors that gather different interests in their 
reform proposals to attract more people (Kenny 2013: 47). The following sections explain how 
feminist institutionalism can be used to analyse political recruitment.   
 
3.2 POLITICAL RECRUITMENT 
3.2.1 The Supply and Demand Model 
The supply and demand model of political recruitment first presented by Norris and Lovenduski 
(1995) and later critiqued and elaborated on by Krook (2010a; 2010b) and Kenny (2013), who 
both apply a feminist institutional approach to the model, will function as a foundation for the 
analysis. The original model makes a distinction between the supply of candidates and the 
demand of party recruiters. Supply of candidates relates to those who come forward as possible 
candidates and the demand of party recruiters relates to what the party recruiters are looking 
for at each stage in the recruitment process. Supply may be influenced by resources such as 
time and money as well as motivational factors that can influence people’s willingness and 
possibility to put themselves forward as candidates. Candidate recruiters may hold prejudices 
about certain groups of people which influence the demand. These factors also relate to each 
other, party recruiters´ prejudices may for example influence the willingness of people coming 
forward (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 106-108). Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 15-16) also 
present the ladder of recruitment, which has been expanded by Lovenduski (2016), see figure 1. 
The ladder of recruitment shows the different stages at which the people that are formally 
eligible to become politicians can fall out of the process (Lovenduski 2016: 520-521). The 
actual candidate selection is thus embedded within a wider structure of party recruitment 
(Kenny 2013: 5), which is taken into account in this thesis, elaborated on in the section covering 
the analytical framework. 
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Figure 1. From Lovenduski (2016: 521).  
 
Lovenduski (2016: 514) has later argued that the supply and demand model, although not 
explicitly, was institutionalist and that it could be improved by taking into account feminist 
institutionalism. In the next section this approach will be elaborated.  
 
3.2.2 Critique of the Supply and Demand Model and Elaborations of it 
Krook (2010a) provides a critique of the supply and demand model and argues that a feminist 
institutional approach should be used to analyse the lack of women as political representatives 
worldwide. The supply and demand model implicitly refers to the economic use of the model, 
with its assumption of a perfect market that leads to equilibriums. It fails to take into account 
the formal and informal processes that distorts this “market perfection”. Furthermore, it does 
not sufficiently incorporate a gender perspective and it can therefore not explain the extensive 
underrepresentation of women in political positions worldwide, as well as differences across 
countries and parties. A broader framework is needed, which regards the market imperfections 
and gender aspects of political recruitment (Krook 2010a: 709-711). Therefore, Krook (2010a: 
711-713) presents three different forms of institutions to take into account in the analysis: 
systemic, practical and normative. Using this approach makes it possible to distinguish between 
different institutions that in the reality overlap, which also gives clarity as to which institutions 
 
 
 
 
 18  
 
that influence “access to political office” (Krook 2010a: 711). Systemic institutions are formal 
and include the laws and organisations that structure the political landscape at large. This 
includes institutions such as electoral systems, number of parties and district size. Practical 
institutions are the procedures and criteria used by party recruiters and can be both formal such 
as requirements about age and citizenship, or informal such as family ties, money or experience. 
These institutions shape the opinions about who is suitable as a candidate, but the practical 
institutions are also formed by the values, or the normative institutions of the party. Normative 
institutions are the principles and values that guide recruitment. They can be formal such as 
party statues, or informal such as public speeches and they can serve to justify gendered 
outcomes of seemingly gender neutral formal institutions. It is more common that parties on 
the left have normative institutions that serve the inclusion of women (Krook 2010a: 711-713). 
There are competing views on norms of equality which “involve a contrast between ‘equality 
of opportunities,’ focused on inputs, and ‘equality of results,’ focused on outputs” (Krook 
2010a: 712). The different institutions interact and shape the selection of female candidates 
(Krook 2010a: 711-713).  
 
 
Examples of Systemic, Practical, and Normative Institutions 
Systemic Institutions 
Electoral system: Majoritarian or proportional, candidate- or list-based vote, open- or closed-party lists, single- or 
multimember districts 
Party system: One-, two-, or multiparty system 
Practical Institutions 
Formal criteria: Age, citizenship, party membership, term limits 
Informal criteria: Ticket-balancing, skills, experience, prominence, party activism, family ties, money, insider or outsider 
status 
Method of ballot composition: Centralized or decentralized, group rights to nominate or veto, primaries or nominations, 
secret or open ballots 
Normative Institutions 
Norms of equality: Equality of opportunity or equality of results (system or party level) 
Norms of representation: Politics of ideas or politics of presence (system or party level) 
Table 1. From Krook (2010a: 711).  
 
Krook (2010a) uses this feminist institutional take on candidate selection to analyse gender 
quotas in different countries and argues “that quotas may reform gendered institutions in 
various ways and degrees, at the same time that they may shift and interact with the effects of 
the other two types of institutions” (Krook 2010a: 717). In a further elaboration by Kenny 
(2013), feminist institutionalism is applied to supply and demand relating to political 
recruitment in general. Kenny (2013) means that a specific focus should be put on the party, in 
contrast to Krook (2010a; 2010b) who puts equal emphasis on institutions both outside and 
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inside of the party. The main focus should thus be on practical and normative institutions, as 
the systemic institutions relate mainly to factors outside of the party. This is also the approach 
taken in this thesis, with systemic institutions only briefly touched upon.   
 
Parties are gendered organisations and gatekeepers to political office (Kenny 2013: 27-28). The 
potential candidates and candidate selectors within parties operate within the party frame of 
norms, party organisation and rules and their attitudes and motivations directly affect the 
recruitment process (Kenny 2013: 15). The demand of party recruiters is shaped by both formal 
and informal criteria (Kenny 2013: 16), and these criteria tend to favour men (Kenny and Verge 
2016: 359). These institutions shape the internal party dynamics, and discriminatory practices 
are not only present on the individual level between party gatekeepers and potential candidates, 
but also on the party level where both formal and informal rules are produced by these gender 
norms (Bjarnegård and Kenny 2016: 372). Discrimination of candidates by party recruiters may 
be both direct, for example by asking discriminatory questions based on judgement about the 
candidates due to belonging to a certain group, or imputed by supposing that candidates 
belonging to a certain group may lose votes (Kenny 2013: 16-17). Most candidate selectors 
being male further disadvantages women (Kenny 2013: 22). The impact of formal rules matter, 
gender quotas force parties to focus on finding suitable female candidates (Bjarnegård and 
Kenny 2016: 373). According to Krook (2010b: 161) the mobilisation of women within parties 
can push them to adopt quotas, however, research on quotas show that the effect of them varies, 
which shows that the demand factors are not easily changed, even with the introduction of the 
formal measure of a quota (Krook 2010b: 161).  
 
Related to this, Kenny (2013: 23) also argues that a greater emphasis should be put on the 
demand side. Although it is important to investigate both supply and demand factors and their 
interaction, the “research evidence increasingly privileges demand-side explanations” (Kenny 
2013: 23). There is normally enough of supply of female candidates to fill the positions within 
the party, if the party actually wishes to include women (Kenny 2013: 24; Bjarnegård 2013: 
118). Demand factors may even shape supply as the parties’ activities can influence the will of 
potential candidates to step forward (Kenny 2013: 24).  
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3.2.3 A Feminist Institutional Approach to Political Recruitment 
Kenny (2013: 25) argues that the original supply and demand model did not sufficiently address 
the gendered processes of political recruitment and the complex way institutions relate to each 
other and influence political recruitment. Of the objections and elaborations explained in the 
previous sections there are four aspects that should be considered when applying a feminist 
institutional approach to the supply and demand model according to Kenny (2013: 27-32). 
Firstly, parties and their internal gendered dynamics are essential to study due to their important 
role as gatekeepers to political office. Secondly, the relation between formal and informal 
institutions should be studied, while acknowledging that there are no sharp distinctions between 
formal and informal but rather a continuum, and therefore it is helpful to look at processes of 
formalisation and informalisation. Lowndes (2014: 687) argues that it indeed is difficult to 
“identify the complex matrix of rules that produce gendered effects in politics” and that it 
therefore is useful to look at how formal and informal are mixed, and avoid making too distinct 
separation, which also is echoed in Kenny’s (2013) approach to feminist institutionalism. Third, 
the interaction between different types of institutions, systemic, practical and normative, 
presented by Krook (2010a) should be analysed and fourth, different forms of change should 
be taken into account. These can be gradual changes, internal pressure for change and specific 
moments which function as windows of opportunities (Kenny 2013: 27-31). 
 
3.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The foundation of the analysis lies in the supply and demand model and although the model is 
more focused at candidate selection, I broaden the perspective and investigate political 
recruitment in general, including both party recruitment and candidate selection. I thus both 
look at how women can enter the party, and how they are represented within different activities, 
leadership bodies and as candidates for election. I argue that it is still possible to use the model 
taking into account the ladder of recruitment presented above. In this we can clearly see that 
who is active within the party matters for the representation in parliaments. Furthermore, 
Lovenduski (2016: 519) claims “that the model, for all its apparent simplicity, has considerable 
capacity to carry ideas, concepts and methodological refinements. It was and is basically up to 
the researcher how to operationalize it”. Furthermore, in relation to applying the model to a 
party in Myanmar, Lovenduski (2016: 519-522) argues that the supply and demand model is 
flexible enough to be applied to different countries, parties and systems, also hybrid-
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democracies. The ladder of recruitment could be applied, as the steps in it are alike across 
contexts, although the mechanisms are different (Lovenduski 2016: 522). I can thus fill this 
frame with the specific context of DPNS and Myanmar.  
 
Although both supply and demand are analysed, the main attention will be on demand factors, 
and how supply and demand interact, as demand has been rendered more important (Kenny 
2013). Out of the four perspectives of feminist institutionalism added by Kenny (2013), three 
will be considered in the analysis. The first perspective – the overall focus on parties and gender 
– is already covered for in the overall theme of this thesis. The other two perspectives covered 
are the formal and informal institutions and the gradient in-between as well as the different 
forms of institutions: systemic, practical and normative. As the focus is on the party, systemic 
institutions are only briefly touched upon. The interaction between informal, formal and the 
different forms of institutions are analysed. However, due to the limited time in the field, I am 
not able to analyse the fourth perspective concerning how institutions change over time.  
 
Below is a schematic picture of the analytical framework. The analysis has the overarching 
division between supply and demand factors, and the analysis will be divided into two parts 
into accordance with this. Within these two sections, the different formal, informal, systemic, 
practical and normative institutions and their interaction is analysed, as well as the interaction 
between supply and demand.  
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Figure 2. Analytical framework.   
 
4. METHODOLOGY  
This chapter describes the methodology of the thesis and the different choices that I made 
throughout the process. Following the theoretical focus, the thesis has taken a feminist 
methodological approach into account. This means that it has been important to establish non-
exploitative relationship with the party and informants, reflect upon my own positionality to 
avoid objectification and to aim to do good with the research (Creswell 2013: 29). This 
approach as well as limitations and ethical considerations will be discussed throughout the 
different sections of this chapter.  
 
 4.1 REFLEXIVITY AND POSITIONALITY  
Coming as a western master’s student to a developing country to collect data for a thesis is not 
unproblematic as this may contribute to colonial-like relations. When western researchers tend 
to dominate research in and about developing countries, this undermines the possibility for 
“local people” speaking for themselves (Scheyvens and McLennan 2014: 5). To counteract this, 
some researchers mean that only people from a specific group could understand that group. 
However, it can also be argued that it is simplifying to state that only people with certain 
attributes can understand people with the same attributes. Also, there are different nuances of 
Supply Demand 
Formal and 
Informal 
Systemic Practical Normative 
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being an insider or outsider (Scheyvens and McLennan 2014: 6-7), and although a researcher 
is from the same country as the informants, other barriers might exist (Sultana 2007: 377-378). 
Cross-cultural research can be positive and lead to increased understanding, but the researchers 
need to be aware of power relations, be reflective and seeing that the research is a two-way 
process (Scheyvens and Leslie 2000: 128-129). A drawback with the study is that it is only a 
partial description of a whole with limited data, but I have tried to stay true to the information 
that was shared with me (Sultana 2007: 378).  
 
Also, representing “others” can be problematic. Mohanty (1988: 64-65) critically examines the 
way western feminist researchers represent women from “third-world countries” and argues 
that there is a tendency of lumping different women together as a group, presenting an “average 
third-world woman”. She argues that “[w]hat is problematical, then, about this kind of use of 
'women' as a group, as a stable category of analysis, is that it assumes an ahistorical, universal 
unity among women based on a generalized notion of their subordination” (Mohanty 1988: 72). 
Instead researchers must make sure to analyse power and gendered processes within the local 
context and highlight contradictions (Mohanty 1988: 73-74). By looking at how actors in the 
party relates to gendered institutions, my aim is to emphasise how these institutions are both 
constraining and enabling, adhered to as well as challenged by different women (and men). 
Also, England (1994: 242-244) writes about the risk of, while representing “others”, fall into 
“patterns of domination”, and therefore argues that analytical reflexivity is important to gain 
insights, consider “the consequences of the interactions with those being investigated”, and 
seeing that researchers are not impersonal, detached from the research. Kobayashi (2003: 347-
348) has questioned this approach, as it may become self-indulgent and “the very act that sets 
us apart”. However, Sultana (2007: 376) argues that the approach still holds validity as it can 
make power relations visible and that reflexivity therefore should be carried out throughout the 
research process. Therefore, during the whole process I have tried to be aware of how my own 
positionality can influence the way I form the research, what I ask during interviews and how I 
then analyse and present the material. I am not an impartial observer, and my own experiences 
have most probably affected the data and my analysis of it. Although I had been in Myanmar 
for 6 months when conducting the interviews, I was still very much an outsider and not being 
able to speak the language. As I interviewed both men and women of different ages, the power 
dynamics was probably different between the different interviews.  
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Although there are drawbacks with conducting research in developing countries, the possible 
positive aspects should also be considered, such as contributing to learning about issues which 
can lead to positive change (Scheyvens and McLennan 2014: 10-11). Hammett et al. (2015: 92) 
write that it is important to consider for whom the research is conducted and who has been 
involved in elaborating the research. In doing this I met with some different organisations 
working on women’s political participation and representation in Myanmar to situate my study. 
I also asked the contact person in the party to give inputs on the research focus. My hope is that 
this thesis will be of some use for DPNS in their work towards a greater representation of 
women and that also local organisations might get some new insight from it. This is also related 
to ethical considerations which have been part of the research process, from start to hand-in. 
Research should not only aim to not do any harm, but to actually do something good (Banks 
and Scheyvens 2014: 160-161).  
 
4.2 ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
As feminist institutionalism with its focus on norms, values and ideas is primarily constructivist 
(Mackay 2011: 182), this is also the ontological and epistemological standpoint taken in this 
thesis, meaning that social entities are considered constructed by actors and continuously 
reconstructed. There are different versions of constructivism and where some claim that there 
is no form of social reality, others have a more moderate approach where social entities such as 
organisations and culture are acknowledged as pre-existent, but at the same time continuously 
formed and understood by actors (Bryman 2012: 33-34). This thesis takes the latter ontological 
approach, seeing that formal political institutions are precisely pre-existent, but at the same time 
can affect, be understood and be used differently by different actors. Using a constructivist 
approach means from an epistemological perspective that the experiences and perspectives of 
different actors are important as there is no absolute truth when the world is filtered through the 
human mind (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 10-11). Therefore, it is important to be careful and 
critical when approaching knowledge, as it is always socially situated and closely related to 
power (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 200-201). With a constructivist perspective, I, as a researcher, 
must reflect upon my own role, as my personal background will affect my interpretations and 
analysis (Creswell 2013: 25), see above section.  
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4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design for this thesis is a case study, and studying a case is to study the particular 
and could constitute a single person or a “bounded system” (Stake 1995: 2). DPNS constitutes 
the case investigated in this thesis and could be argued to be an instrumental case as an 
instrumental case is studied to comprehend something else. The understanding of this case may 
contribute to the greater understanding of women’s underrepresentation. However, the focus is 
still on the specifics of this particular case (Stake 1995: 3-4). The case is bounded in time and 
space and cannot be generalised and should only function as a practical example. According to 
Flyvbjerg (2006: 221-228) context-specific knowledge is just as important as generalisation, 
and the potential lack of generalisability from qualitative case studies should thus not be seen 
as a problem.  
 
Although I chose to do a case study, an ethnographic study might have been a more suitable 
design as this type of study investigates a group which shares a culture, such as a political party. 
The focus lies on behaviours, values and beliefs, and the study is conducted through extensive 
fieldwork (Creswell 2013: 90-92). Although the study of these factors would have been good 
and given a deeper understanding of the dynamics within the party, it was not possible due to 
access, time constraint and the language barrier. Doing a case-study was thus the second-best 
option as case studies contribute with examples to a field of research, and the approach I opted 
for (Flyvbjerg 2006: 219).  This is important from a feminist perspective as documenting 
women’s situation in different countries through case studies and building increased 
understanding can make action to counteract gender injustices effective (Reinharz 1992: 168-
171), such as ways to work against women’s political underrepresentation.   
 
For the analysis, attention should be paid to details in a case study (Creswell 2013: 199). 
According to Flyvbjerg (2006: 238) one technic when describing a case study is to let the case 
develop in detail in the text and avoid making summaries. The case should tell the story itself, 
allowing for the different opinions and understandings uncovered in the research process to 
come forward and in this way making it possible for the readers of the case to create their own 
understanding of the it (Flyvbjerg 2006: 237-238).  
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4.4 DATA COLLECTION 
4.4.1 Sampling 
The interviews were conducted in Yangon between the 23rd of January and the 5th of March 
2018, for list of interviews see the appendix. I had an idea on who I wanted to talk to and at the 
same time I used the contacts I established to find more people of interest, which could be seen 
as combination of purposive and snowball sampling (Bryman 2012: 418). A contact person in 
the party functioned as a gatekeeper and arranged five interviews with people active within the 
party, which I had requested. One of these informants arranged three interviews with people I 
asked for. I was also advised by two different persons outside of the party to talk to a specific 
person and I contacted this person myself. Working with a gatekeeper to the party might 
however be problematic as gatekeepers might steer the research by choosing who the researcher 
can interview (Banks and Scheyvens 2014: 172-173). I hope to have avoided this by specifically 
ask for certain people and also finding others to interview through other contacts. However, the 
analysis would probably have become different if I had interviewed other people in the party. 
As I also wanted to find out about formal institutions within the party, the party’s policy on 
political attitudes and a folder from YNS8 are included in the analysis, but constitute only a 
minor part of it.  
 
5 women and 4 men were interviewed and I have chosen to interview both women and men 
within the party due to two reasons. Firstly, studying gender does not equal studying women 
and “a gendered analysis is as much about men and masculinity as it is about women and 
femininity” (Bjarnegård 2013: 1). A feminist perspective provides a critical way of studying 
men in politics, without taking men and masculine practices as implicit norms (Bjarnegård 
2013: 16-17). Second, I have set out to understand gendered institutions relating to political 
recruitment within the party, and as the party includes both women and men, I wanted to get 
insights in how women and men respectively understand the party dynamics to get a fuller 
picture of them.  
 
 
 
                                               
8 The folder from YNS is in English. However, the text about political attitudes is in Myanmar language. I 
therefore used Google translate to see which parts of the text that seemed interesting. The translations of 
these parts were checked by a Myanmar speaking person.  
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4.4.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
I used semi-structured interviews with DPNS party members to collect data. As the research is 
conducted from a constructivist perspective the informants own versions of the situation within 
the party is of great importance. Therefore, the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured 
way to give some freedom to follow up on unexpected areas of interest, but to still have some 
structure to depart from. In such an approach, not all the questions in the guide will have to be 
asked if other areas are more interesting (Bryman 2012: 470-471). This enhances the 
opportunity to understand what each informant thinks of the situation. To understand how 
candidate selection is happening and how gender influences parties it is necessary to talk to the 
actors themselves, and interviews are therefore a suitable method to investigate these processes 
(Kenny 2013: 61). Furthermore, interviews provide a useful way to understand “informal 
interactions and behaviors that can be…important to political outcomes” (Kapiszewski et al. 
2015: 190). I also aimed at having an open approach during the interviews, such as being open 
to answer questions asked by the informants, in the hope to establish less hierarchical interview 
relations in line with the feminist approach (Bryman 2012: 491-492). Furthermore, I tried to 
constantly reflect how my own positionality may have influenced the answers I was given.  
 
In-depth interviews can be conducted with one or two persons at the time (Kapiszewski et al. 
2015: 194). 9 people were interviewed and all except one interview were conducted 
individually. This interview was out of convenience conducted with 2 men simultaneously. 
This was positive in that the they could interact, add and contrast their experiences with each 
other (Bryman 2012: 501). However, it could also affect the things they said as “participants 
may be more prone to expressing culturally expected views” (Bryman 2012: 518). A possible 
limitation with interviews generally is that informants may exert power by withholding or 
sharing certain information (Scheyvens and McLennan 2014: 9). It could also be so that the 
informants did not share their exact opinions during the interviews due to party policies and 
loyalty to the party. Relating to this is the location of the interviews. All, except one interview, 
were conducted at the DPNS office in Yangon. One interview was conducted at a café. As it is 
important that the informants feel comfortable, to the extent possible I let them choose the 
locations. The location can also provide important insights about the informants’ reality 
(Hammett et al. 2015: 157- 158), and seeing the DPNS office made me better understand the 
preconditions for DPNS and its members. However, as a gatekeeper arranged 5 of the 
interviews it is possible that the decision of interview space was a way of directing the research. 
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Formal spaces, such as a party office, may lead to informants not saying things opposed to the 
official party line (Hammett et al. 2015: 157-158).  
 
The informants were all active party members within the central part of the party. As the 
interviews are anonymised I will not account for the informants’ exact positions in the party. 
Anonymity is important to consider in order to protect informants. Disclosing too much 
information could make identification possible (Banks and Scheyvens 2014: 168). As it is 
important that participants in research projects are aware about the purpose, what the interview 
material will be used for and that participation is entirely voluntary (Banks and Scheyvens 
2014: 164; Brinkmann and Kvale 2015: 93), I explained this orally in the beginning of the 
interviews and also gave them written information in English or Myanmar language. When 
giving this information I also asked if I could record the interviews, which all informants 
consented to.  
Three expert interviews were also conducted with two representatives from Phan Tee Eain, one 
representative from Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy and one representative for 
Triangle Women Support Group. In addition to the three expert interviews I also met with three 
different organisations, Oxfam, Gender Equality Network and International Women’s 
Development Agency, and a research consultant for informal discussions on how to situate my 
study before I started doing interviews.  
4.4.3 Translating 
For five interviews a translator was present. The two informants that were interviewed together 
spoke some English, but were more comfortable in Myanmar language. They mixed the 
languages and the translator thus translated parts of this interview. As these informants spoke 
English they also listened to the translations and seemed content with how she transferred the 
messages. Four interviews were translated fully by the translator. Although the translations 
seem to have been accurate the use of a translator can still affect the quality of the data obtained 
as there is a greater gap between me (the researcher) and the informants. The translator might 
not translate exactly what the informants are saying (McLennan et al. 2014: 156-157). For the 
last interview an English-speaking party member translated. This of course may influence the 
answers in a negative way, as the informant may have answered differently than if it was not 
someone from within the party. Also, the translations may have become more biased, with the 
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translating party member’s own thoughts mixed in with the translations (McLennan et al. 2014: 
153-157). Therefore, I have handled the data from this interview sparsely and with more care. 
 
4.5 TRANSCRIBING AND PRESENTING 
I transcribed the interviews manually word by word and due to the differences between oral 
and written language, quotes in the analysis section have been changed to a correct written 
language, both for readability and out of respect for the informants and translators (Brinkmann 
and Kvale 2015: 213-214). In other aspects, the quotes are presented as the informant or 
translator said it. The translators mixed first and third person in the translations and keeping 
this in original makes the translators visible in the research and allows for greater awareness of 
the impact translations may have on the meaning of what is said (Edwards 1998: 202-203). 
Transcribing can be difficult, and different persons may write the same spoken sentences in 
different ways (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015: 211-212), I therefore tried to transcribe the 
interviews as soon as possible, when I still had them fresh in mind.  
 
4.6 CODING AND ANALYSING 
To analyse the data, I followed Creswell’s (2013: 182-188) approach, which he describes as a 
data analysis spiral, as different steps are going at the same time, and already in the field. It is 
thus not a linear process, although some steps follow each other. After transcribing I entered 
the data into the software programme NVivo. Working within NVivo is positive as it makes the 
coding of the material effective. However, there are also concerns that these types of software 
programmes, among other things, fragments the material (Bryman 2012: 592-593). I have tried 
to counteract this by reading the transcripts in their full version several times and taking notes. 
I classified the material into many specific categories, or codes (Creswell 2013: 183-184). The 
women’s and men’s answers were coded separately as I wanted to easier distinguish patterns 
in the responses, but they are presented within the same structure. I also divided the codes 
between supply and demand factors in accordance with the analytical framework. Therein, I 
arranged the codes that shared similar ideas into themes. I interpreted the data, reading my 
coding a few times and identified within these different themes the different forms of 
institutions at play (Creswell 2013: 185-187), thus the different formal and informal as well as 
the systemic, practical and normative institutions.  
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5. ANALYSIS 
In this chapter the interview data and the textual material is analysed in accordance with the 
analytical framework presented in the theory chapter. Supply and demand are analysed 
separately, but their interaction is treated throughout the two sections. Focus is laid on formal 
and informal institutions and the different types of institutions: systemic, practical and 
normative, as well as their interaction.  
 
5.1 SUPPLY  
This section describes how different institutions affect the supply of people to be engaged in 
the party, and how this relates to the demand of party recruiters. Below is a table where the 
different institutions that came up during the interviews can be seen in relation to degree of 
formality as well as whether the institution were systemic, practical or normative.  
 
  Informal   Formal 
Systemic    Education system 
    Constitution 
Practical Lack of money    
Normative Women’s 
obligations in the 
home 
   
 Women as 
unpolitical    
 
Table 2. Institutions relating to political recruitment within DPNS - Supply. 
 
In this section on institutions relating to supply, firstly some informal normative institutions are 
presented, which is followed by a presentation of an informal practical institution and formal 
systemic institutions that limit women’s representation. 
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5.1.1 Informal Normative Institutions 
Conservative normative institutions limit women’s political representation. Although there are 
no such formal institutions neither in the party or in the country9, there are informal ones. 
Mentioned by all of the women, and one of the men, was the double obligation women have, 
both for the household and to provide an income (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7). Four of the 
women mentioned their own experiences, with parents expecting them to take care of them 
when they grow old, parents who think that the right place for women is in the home and 
husbands who do not share the responsibility of the household (Interviews 2, 3, 5 and 7). 
However, the opinions about these practices seemed to differ, where one woman mentioned 
that time management therefore was a challenge, as she really wanted to devote time to the 
party, but at the same time she did not seem to think that the unequal division of household 
labour needed to change (Interview 2). One the other hand, one woman had challenged her 
husband concerning this division of work – basically stopping to do some household tasks she 
was expected to do. First her husband had asked her why she was not doing it, but after a while 
he had accepted it (Interview 7). She challenged the informal norm that she should take all the 
responsibility for the home and succeeded – thus managed to change to way things in the 
household were done. One informant said that if a woman goes into politics she would worry 
and look back at her family much more than a man would (Interview 5). This could mean that 
women also take a larger emotional responsibility for the household, and not only concerning 
the practical aspects. The same woman also said that: 
 
[h]er father also thinks that women should stay at home and cook and do 
household tasks, get married and have children. That's the idea that they still have 
in their mind. But she said still I want to be a politician so I will do what I want 
to (Interview 5).  
 
The responsibility for the household makes it difficult for the women to enter politics, but also 
to stay active. As also mentioned in the background section, women in Myanmar often are 
expected to take care of the household. This issue is theorized by Chant (2007) who in her 
                                               
9 There is however an article in the constitution (and thus a formal systemic institution) which states that 
“[t]he Union shall, upon specified qualifications being fulfilled, in appointing or assigning duties to civil 
service personnel, not discriminate for or against any citizen of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 
based on race, birth, religion, and sex. However, nothing in this Section shall prevent appointment of men 
to the positions that are suitable for men only” (The Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2008: Article 352). 
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research on The Gambia, The Philippines and Costa Rica concludes that there is an ongoing 
feminisation of responsibility and obligation. This meaning that women put increasingly time 
into paid labour, but at the same time maintain the responsibility of the unpaid household work. 
The increasing responsibility of women as bread-winners to the family does not seem to give 
any power in renegotiating the responsibilities in the home with men, neither is there any other 
rewards to this increased responsibility, such as increased freedom. Especially young women 
may face these difficulties with increasing education levels and higher earning capacity (Chant 
2007: 333-337). However, as described above, one of the interviewed women had actually been 
able to renegotiate these responsibilities.  
 
In general terms, the informants mentioned other conservative normative institutions that make 
it more difficult for women to travel (Interviews 3 and 5), stay away from home (Interview 4b), 
and that assert women as non-political (Interviews 1, 3 4a, 4b, 6 and 7) and unsuitable for 
leadership (Interviews 3 and 4). One woman put this in relation to the role of Aung San Suu 
Kyi as:  
 
[t]hat kind of thinking still exists in our society. Even though they let Daw Aung 
San Suu Kyi be the leader, they don't think all females have that capacity. They 
still feel that female is the, I don't know, the second sex (Interview 3).  
 
5.1.2 An Informal Practical Institution 
An informal practical institution that seems to influence both political participation and 
representation, but not have any direct gendered effects is the difficult financial situation for 
both individuals and for the party. Three women and three men expressed that the economic 
situation affects the possibility for people to be active in politics and they spoke both in general 
terms and shared their own experiences of this (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b and 5). One woman 
said that to be a good politician you would need an economic income, such as a supportive 
family or a union in the back (Interview 5). The role of the parents for young people is also 
important as parents might not want their children to participate as it is not a good future in 
politics since it does not provide a good income (Interviews 3, 4a and 4b). This could be seen 
as an informal normative institution, with values about what things parents believe are good for 
their children. The lack of money also affects the party at large, as it is difficult for it to find 
 
 
 
 
 33  
 
funding. This is easier for bigger, more established parties such as NLD and USDP 
(Interview 1).  
 
5.1.3 Formal Systemic Institutions 
To change the informal normative institutions that assert that women should stay in the home, 
one informant believed education to be essential as “education or maybe capacity building 
programmes, that's the only way we can change Burma” (Interview 3), and another informant 
claimed that the poor education system is a direct cause for people thinking that men are more 
worth than women, and that the education system therefore needs reformation (Interview 4a). 
To this the informant in the same interview added that “there are two matters. One is education 
and one is politics. You cannot completely change the people if your education system is always 
like this. [-] You cannot change the education if you don't change the politics” (Interview 4b). 
In relation to this, one woman said that people do not understand that what they do is actually 
concerned with politics, such as cooking, and that this limits political participation. Villagers, 
especially women do not know that they can contribute to the country, or how (Interview 2), 
and according to Kempel et al. (2015: 20) there are low levels of awareness of politics among 
the poor rural population, especially among women. The educational system is a formal 
systemic institution, which in this case according to the informants forms the way people think, 
and thus the informal normative institutions. This necessarily does not only relate to supply 
factors, but could also affect demand and the way party recruiters think. It is also, according to 
the last informant, linked to the whole political system. In general, people do not understand 
why political parties are important, or appreciate the work they do (Interview 1), which limits 
political participation. Furthermore, due to the military history and that some parties have strong 
connections to the military there is a lack of trust among people for political parties 
(Interview 1). The way the systemic institutions relating to the military affect political 
participation is elaborated on in the next paragraph.  
Two women and two men mentioned fear for reprisals as a hinderance towards participating in 
politics. The system with the 2008 constitution and the power still hold on to by the military 
was seen as a problem, either because parents fear for their children that are active in politics, 
or for the politicians fearing that the military would punish their family members for them being 
active. One woman only spoke in general terms (Interview 2), while the others mentioned how 
this affected them (Interviews 3, 4a and 4b). The constitution is a formal systemic institution 
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and it guarantees power to the military (Williams 2011: 1202). It does not only affect the 
recruitment to the party due to fear, but it also makes it difficult to find candidates that want to 
stand for election as many that sympathise with the party have their roots in the activist 
movements and do not want to work within the existing structure (Interview 1). Also, the 
oppressive laws make it difficult to work as a political party (Interviews 1 and 8), although it 
has become easier (Interview 8). However, there did not seem to be any gendered differences 
in relation to this institution. In this section on supply some different formal and informal 
institutions that limit women’s, but also men’s political representation, as neither the practical 
or the systemic institutions presented seem to have any direct gendered effects. The analysis 
now moves on to focusing on institutions on the demand side.  
 
5.2 DEMAND 
This section treats the institutions relating to demand. Below is a table that shows the degree of 
formality and the different types of institutions just as in the supply section. However, as the 
focus is on the party, systemic institutions are not included in the analysis.  
 
 
 Informal   Formal 
Practical  Lack of money   
 
Recruitment 
Criteria 
   
   Organising Trips  
    
Election 
Committee 
    Quota 
    
Recruitment 
Guidelines 
   
YNS policy of 
one woman and 
one man on 
highest positions 
 
  
Asking for 
women  
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Women 
recruiting other 
women 
  
 
Lack of 
implementation 
on township level 
   
 
Women’s agenda 
last priority 
   
 
30% quota as a 
ceiling 
   
 
Not following 
guidelines 
   
 Favouring men    
Normative    
Equality in Party 
Policy 
 
 
  Women’s rights 
in YNS folder 
 Why informants 
believe women 
are important in 
politics 
   
 Women are only 
members as 
support 
   
 
Table 3. Institutions relating to political recruitment within DPNS - Demand.  
 
In the below analysis, there is first a description of the general aspects of recruitment to the 
party. Thereafter the formal and informal normative institutions that guide the actions of the 
party are presented, followed by the formal and informal practical institutions that can 
contribute to women’s representation in the party. However, there are also informal practical 
and normative institutions that undermine them, which are presented, followed by a 
presentation of formal practical institutions that the WWC has suggested and demanded should 
be implemented to ensure women’s representation within the party. As these are not yet in 
place, they are not presented in the above table.  
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5.2.1 Party Recruitment and Candidate Selection 
DPNS now has around 15 000 members and part of formalising the party in the country is to 
recruit new members (Interview 1). Both DPNS and YNS are recruiting and use some different 
ways of doing this such as organising trips, through the Youth Empowerment School, YES, and 
by approaching certain people. However, several of the informants mentioned that it is difficult 
to recruit people due to both the party’s economy and the economy of the people they target, as 
mentioned in the supply section. The supply factors are then perceived as limiting the possibility 
of the party to recruit. One woman expressed how the economic situation affected not only the 
possibility to recruit people, but also how it affected her feeling to recruit people to be active in 
the party ”I feel very you know uncomfortable to persuade them, [-] because I cannot pay them” 
(Interview 3). The same informant also considered recruitment the most difficult thing about 
being an active politician (Interview 3). One man also connected the difficulty to reach the 30% 
quota directly to the economic problem, and that both men and women have to work both for 
their family and for the party but that ”[f]or the women the situation is more difficult” (Interview 
1). One woman said she enjoyed recruiting new members, since this is very important for the 
party. However, she also said it was difficult due to the many barriers, but that “especially those 
who have a lot of opportunity, they don't want to work for the politics. But in the local area, 
people really good to, wanted to be, willing to be a politician. Interesting huh?” (Interview 7). 
People need convincing though, and for example farmers think that:  
 
[w]e are like farmer, we do not really know everything. Oh no, you know a lot of 
things. You're a farmer, I don't know about the farming. But you know better than 
me. So you have to teach me about that. So I will share something that I know. 
This is really important. Otherwise if you don't share that you have a difficulty I 
don't know, ok, and the government don't know. So how can the government solve 
it for you? (Interview 7). 
 
It is thus important to convince people that politics is important, and as also mentioned in the 
supply section, people might not know that many everyday things can be political (Interview 2).  
As stated in the background chapter, the party has a strong foundation within different activist 
movements and this is one recruitment base (Interview 1). Although it is difficult to recruit 
people who identify as activists, as mentioned in the supply section, one informant said that 
“we like to be a party of activists, activist farmers, activist workers, activists, student activists, 
youth activist. So we try to recruit, we target theses activists to be our active members” 
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(Interview 1). Other traits that were mentioned by the informants as important that the new 
members to the party should possess were having the time to be engaged (Interviews 5 and 8), 
being devoted to politics (Interviews 2, 4a, 5 and 6), agreeing with the party values (Interview 1) 
and listen well to the people (Interview 5). One woman also said she especially wanted more 
young women in the party (Interview 3). These are informal practical institutions or criteria for 
party recruitment.  
 
During the organising trips, DPNS and YNS meet with people in different parts of Myanmar 
and explain about the party (Interviews 3, 4b, 5, 7 and 8). YNS has a strategy that they do an 
activity with the youth they meet, and then they try to recruit the youth that participated. But it 
is difficult as they have to explain things many times to be able to convince the youth, and they 
rely on support by DPNS (Interview 5). The YES is also a base for recruitment, but it is 
sometimes troublesome as the youth come from different parts of Myanmar and once they have 
returned it might be difficult to keep their engagement up (Interview 3). Several informants said 
that the recruitment of new members is the duty of every member of the party (Interviews 2, 3, 
4a and 4b), however two women also mentioned that the Central Organising Committee holds 
most responsibility (Interviews 3 and 5). Also, YNS should take more responsibility to recruit 
youths (Interviews 4a and 5).   
 
The candidates for election are according to one informant chosen by an election committee 
that is formed prior to the election (Interview 8). The selection process thus seems to be 
centralised, in contrary to how the selection process often function within Myanmar parties 
with township officials making the initial selection of candidates (Kempel et al. 2015: 27). The 
selection of candidates is guided by recruitment guidelines, of which the 30% quota is part 
(Interview 1). For the next election the party will focus on six stronghold areas, and then try to 
expand that (Interview 1).  
 
5.2.2 Normative Institutions Enabling the Representation of Women 
As mentioned in the supply section, informal normative institutions assert women as unsuitable 
for politics, however, there are both formal and informal normative institutions within the party 
that go against this. The four party values are freedom, equality, solidarity and democracy and 
the party also states that it supports the women’s rights movement (DPNS 2018e). The 
programme of YNS states that they should “[d]evelop the status of women through their 
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empowerment and participation in the political sphere” (YNS 2015). These are formal 
normative institutions, but these values are also reflected in informal normative institutions 
among the informants. They unanimously disagreed on the perceptions that asserts women as 
unpolitical and should stay in the home. Instead they gave some different reasons as to why 
women were needed in politics and in the party. One way of looking at gender equality is 
equality of opportunities (Krook 2010a: 712) and this argument was used by two men who 
mentioned justice as an important factor (Interviews 1 and 8), and one of them put it in 
connection to the party’s political standpoint about equality, as “if you do not take the issue [of 
women’s representation] I think the party will never be equal” (Interview 1).  
 
Another way of looking at women’s representation is to see “politics of presence” as important, 
as a certain group’s representation may lead to different political outcomes (Krook 2010a: 712). 
This was highlighted by one of the men and several of the women. One woman put her political 
beliefs of social democracy in relation to the need for women in politics and meant that women 
are needed as they know how to manage the household budget, and therefore would have 
valuable knowledge to contribute with to welfare policies (Interview 3). Another woman meant 
that although men and women are equal “women can do better than men” as ”they focus on 
what they are going to do and they do it” in comparison to men who are not as focused 
(Interview 5). Two persons thought that there would be a softer climate with more discussions 
and dialogue if more women were politically active (interviews 7 and 8), and one of them also 
though it would become more inclusive as women think more about this (Interview 7). A third 
perspective was mentioned by a man who said that since half of the voters are women, which 
is a lot of votes, it is important with women as representatives from an election perspective 
(Interview 1). Including women as a strategy to look modern and progressive and to gain votes 
has been found common among socialist parties (Dahlerup 2006a: 295).  
 
Two of the informants used the arguments of a “politics of ideas”, which asserts that it is not 
who presents the ideas, but rather what ideas that are presented that matter (Krook 2010a: 712). 
However, these informants believed this with the precondition that conservative gender norms 
no longer would be at play. One women expressed that “if you are really devoted, passionate 
for the country then it doesn't matter if you are a man or a woman, then you are suited for 
politics” (Interview 2) and one man hoped that in the future people would “look to the quality, 
qualifications, what the person can do, not the gender” (Interview 4a).  
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The institutions presented in this section are all normative and should be promoting women’s 
inclusion in politics. They are also reflected in some practical institutions that are presented in 
the next section.  
 
5.2.3 Practical Institutions Enabling the Representation of Women 
As earlier mentioned there is one formal practical institution in place within DPNS aimed at 
increasing women’s representation in the party: a 30% gender quota. This quota refers to both 
the selection of candidates and to representation within internal party structures (Interview 7). 
It was adopted in the early 2000’s (Interview 8), but has still not been reached in any body 
within the party. If recruitment happen without this quota in mind, it will not be fulfilled and 
the party will not accomplish equal representation of women and men. Parties are shown to be 
conservative regarding change, which gender quotas bring along (Kenny and Verge 2016: 360), 
and “changes in the formal rules of the candidate selection process – including the introduction 
of gender quota measures – may not necessarily translate into changes in the day-to-day 
practices of recruitment” (Kenny 2013: 32). It is common that although the party complies with 
the quota formally, informal mechanisms are at play that actually limit women’s equal 
representation, such as placing female candidates in constituencies with unwinnable seats 
(Kenny and Verge 2016: 363), and findings related to such informal processes are elaborated 
on in section 5.2.4.  
 
The quota was adopted while the party was in exile in Mae Sot. One man said that the party 
members there participated in trainings organised by, among others, Burmese Women’s Union. 
However, it took some time to understand what gender and the quota system entail 
(Interview 8). ABSDF did also organise women’s empowerment trainings at the Thai-Myanmar 
border (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004: 409). Three of the men and one woman linked the importance 
of a quota to the barriers women face (Interviews 1, 4b, 7 and 8). This argument is what could 
be called a “fast-track argument”, in comparison to an incremental argument. The fast-track 
argument asserts the importance of affirmative action to counteract gender discrimination 
(Dahlerup 2006b: 8). To counteract informal normative institutions on the supply and the 
demand sides, a formal practical institution is adopted on the demand side. Several of the 
informants expressed that it would be good to have a quota at the national level (Interviews 
3,4a, 4b, 6, 8), which would be a formal systemic institution.  
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Within YNS there is a semi-formal practical institution in place which states that the chairperson 
and the general secretary in YNS always should be one woman and one man. The policy is not 
formally described in any policy, but seem to be agreed upon informally (Interviews 3 and 4b), 
and could thus be seen as a semi-formal institution. There are also some semi-informal practical 
institutions that promote the representation and recruitment of women to the party. During the 
organising trips, it is important to ask especially for women to come to their meetings, as it 
otherwise only would come men due to normative institutions on the supply side:  
 
they will ask the captain to gather more women than men. Usually the men will 
be the one who go and women will stay at home and cook or do whatever they 
ask them to do, so now for them they always tell the captain to send more women. 
If the men can come it is ok, but they want more women. That's how they recruit 
women members (Interview 5).  
 
As mentioned, YES is an unofficial place for recruitment, and when finding participants to their 
youth course, they also specifically ask for women (Interview 3). Some of the informants also 
thought that it was easier for women to recruit other women to the party (Interviews 3, 4a, 5, 7).  
One of them, a woman, in relation to this also said that they recruit women through building 
relationships over some time and visiting people’s houses (Interview 7). However, she also 
thought it was important that men also take responsibility for the recruitment of women:  
 
men always think that we are very responsible person. Something like that, so it 
is good that we say that we all have responsibility, we will work together. Not 
only the women’s group is working for that (Interview 7).  
 
This section has shown some practical institutions already in place that should favour women. 
However, as the next section shows, there exist some institutions that limit their effect.  
 
5.2.4 Practical and Normative Institutions Limiting the Representation of Women  
Although there are normative and practical institutions stating that women’s representation is 
important, other informal practical and normative institutions lead to few women being 
represented within different parts of the party. WWC is trying to counteract this and from a 
theoretical perspective, the women act in a window of opportunity as times of transitions makes 
gender reforms possible (Kenny 2013: 45-46), but according to one woman the formalisation 
of the party is used as an excuse not to work on the issue, as the main priority now is to get 
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more members generally. Because of this, the quota is not communicated well to all levels of 
the party. When the central part of the party organises activities and trainings, she said that the 
township level “most of them, they only send two men. Always two men” (Interview 3). When 
she had wondered about why there were only men in the activities, “they reply me, no they 
didn't get any information from their leader. [-] So that they only sent, they just give the 
information to men and they just decide to send two men. Not two women” (Interview 3). 
Another problem with the implementation of the quota on township level was according to the 
same woman that ”some leader in the township level they don't really understand what gender 
equality is” (Interview 3). Another woman also said that people are interested in the quota in 
the cities, and less so in villages (Interview 5). A third woman said that some men in township 
level think that the women only become members as support (Interview 7), which is an informal 
normative institution. The underlying factor that there are not many women would in this case 
be on the supply side, a normative informal institution that oblige women to stay at home, while 
men can take part in political activities. That the quota is not implemented on the other hand, 
relates to the lack of communication about gender policies from the central to other parts of the 
party. This could be seen as an informal practical institution about how things are done. 
According to one woman there is not enough focus on reaching the quota aim (Interview 3). 
Although leaders saying it is important, they do not talk about how to implement it, and in 
general, the women agenda is always the last priority (Interview 7). As mentioned in the 
background chapter, many parties in Myanmar have weak party structures (Stokke et al. 
2015: 22) and a disconnect between central and regional parts of the party (Kempel et al. 2015: 
16), which is also influenced by parties being new within Myanmar (Stokke et al. 2015: 22). 
According to one man, it was easier for the party to implement the quota in the border area:  
 
So like the difficulties for DPNS is not in border line, but when we enter to Burma 
and when we organise the people here. So it was a very very new idea for the 
people so when we organise them we have to explain them but even so there are 
so many people who oppose it (Interview 8).  
 
One woman reflected upon the gender quota, and how men relates to this, stating that: 
 
[w]e said that at least 30% quota mean, at least mean, you can have more. Not 
only 30. So men always think that at least 30% means that 30% is enough. We 
say more than that. So start for 30 (Interview 7).  
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Few parties globally have adopted internal gender quotas for leadership positions, and when 
they actually exist they tend to function as ceilings, not starting points for equal representation. 
Parties tend to be resistant in working for gender issues without outside obligations imposed 
(Cornwall and Goetz 2005: 788). The same woman also mentioned some different countries as 
sources for inspiration for gender equality measures, among them the Philippines and Sweden, 
and also reflected upon why DPNS were not having a 50% quota, as they are stating that it is a 
gender quota, it is 30% reserved for both women and men, which means that they could be 70% 
women (Interview 7).  
 
The quota is also part of the guidelines for the selection of candidates. On being asked whether 
the party follow its own guidelines most women said that they were followed. However, two of 
the men expressed that this was not always possible. One said that:  
 
let's say like 80% we follow the guidelines yes. Because like mostly the DPNS 
wants to follow its guidelines but when we collect, when we get the candidates 
maybe it is not 100% perfect. That is what we hope for or maybe that 80% they 
have that kind of capacity (Interview 8), 
 
and another said that ”I think sometimes we have to negotiate. Even our guideline. So I mean, 
nobody can, how to say, sometimes guidelines are quite hard. It is difficult to fit everyone, so 
sometimes you have to negotiate” (Interview 1). Thus, there is awareness, but also seems to be 
acceptance that the guidelines are not fully adhered to. This related to the guidelines in general 
and thus include more than the gender quota. However, there is a risk that traditional gender 
norms influence these processes, and as one woman stated about the situation in Myanmar in 
general women have to be better as if a man and a woman with the same talent would apply for 
a position “they will choose men” (Interview 5). 
 
As this section shows, there is a mismatch between the normative institutions and practical 
institutions that should lead in a positive direction and the mostly practical institutions that 
undermine this. Implementation is a key issue here and as one woman expressed it “The party 
leaders have very progressive views. It is a very progressive view, and they talk. It is very open. 
Interesting is like, they are not really implementing for them“ (Interview 7). According to her, 
now the leaders of the party needs to talk of these issues to be able to implement the gender 
quota.  
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5.2.5 Formal Practical Institutions as a Strategy to Increase Women’s Representation 
As there are problems with the recruitment of women, the WWC now has been formed 
(Interviews 3 and 7). One woman said that although WWC would work to get more women 
into and active in the party, their aim is not to find women that only want to work for gender 
issues, but for “the whole Burma” (Interview 2).  
 
Where the men mentioned the importance of equal representation, most of the women also 
elaborated on how this could be achieved, and the difficulties women face within the party. 
Several strategies had been suggested by the WWC, or demanded as one of the women 
described it (Interview 3), to the leadership bodies of the party. These suggestions all constitute 
practical ways to get more women involved, but also strategies to change the underlying 
problem of conservative gender perceptions. The WWC is thus by formal practical institutions 
trying to counteract the informal practical and normative institutions that hinder women from 
entering the party.  
 
To counteract the problems with township levels only sending men to trainings and activities, 
the WWC has now demanded that they have to send one man and one woman (Interview 3). 
They have called for that there should always be 50% women and 50% men in trainings and 
activities (Interview 3). Also, they should go around and talk to both men and women about 
gender equality. One woman mentioned explaining this issue for men as a solution to the 
implementation at township level (Interview 3), and another woman also said that they have to 
convince women and explain to them why they work for women’s rights, as also women think 
that their task is to support the men to be able to do politics. Therefore, they tell them that ”I 
can also be in the front. So sometimes you can be a bit back. So we will support each other” 
(Interview 7). This would also function as a solution to the problem that there are men at the 
township level that think women only are members as support (Interview 7).  
 
Another practical measure is that at least two women should be part of the organising trips the 
party makes to recruit new members and organise the party in different parts of the country. 
There seem to be a tendency that only men go and these trips, and that male leaders think that 
“this person important, that person important, but women are not there” (Interview 7). She 
however also said that the leaders thought the idea of at least two women joining the organising 
trips was good, but that they also were concerned about the money as it is expensive to go on 
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these trips. This woman therefore though it was important to prioritise where they should go, 
and divide people up, and although some people were really important and should go, they also 
needed to remember that women should go as well (Interview 7). Other things WWC is 
planning to implement in order to enhance women’s opportunities in the party is to have more 
activities directed toward women, a women youth group, as well as elaborating a vision and 
mission for WWC (Interview 3) and establishing it as a women’s wing of the party (Interviews 
3 and 7). Some of the most visible activities of the party during the spring of 2018 relate to 
women’s representation and rights. On 5th of March the WWC arranged an appeal and a press 
conference, urging the government to sign article 29 of the CEDAW. In April the party arranged 
a women’s leadership training, and also participated in a conference on women’s participation 
in the peace process. Both which are highlighted at prime position on their website (DPNS 
2018d).  
 
Several of the informants mentioned that female candidates need and should get more support 
than male candidates. One man said that women should be supported financially, and that in 
comparison with other parties it would still not be very much, so it was important to especially 
focus on women (Interview 8). Two women stated that it is good that party members give kind 
gestures and words as support (Interviews 2 and 5), whereas one woman elaborated on a more 
practical measure, as the WWC wants to start trainings only for the female candidates, as they 
have less time, less possibility to get information and less skills as their chances of improving 
their skills not are as good as for men (Interview 7). The WWC had suggested this to the party 
leaders, but the woman explaining this remained doubtful as to whether the party would accept 
it or not. Although they had said it was a good idea, they are concerned about the cost (Interview 
7). This measure is directed to the supply factor that women lack possibilities for education and 
therefore have less skill, which in this way is counteracted through a measure on the demand 
side. Cornwall and Goetz (2005: 795-798) argue that spaces for political learning, or political 
apprenticeship outside of the formal political spaces are essential to engender democracy, and 
not only making sure there are women in politics, but that these women also have the tools to 
act and achieve change. There is a risk that women’s wings in parties merely become “tea-
making brigades”, with no real power to influence, and other spaces for political learning are 
often patriarchal and traditional (Cornwall and Goetz 2005: 795).  
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This section has described the ways in which women in the party are trying to get more women 
involved. Although there are institutions that limit women’s participation, some institutions are 
already in place that should favour women, and more seem to be coming. According to one 
woman, the gender quota in itself function as a support for them to work on the issue 
(Interview 7).   
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has aimed at investigating the gendered institutions that influence women’s 
descriptive representation in politics, with a specific focus on political recruitment and 
representation within the Democratic Party for a New Society and their youth wing, Youth for 
a New Society. The overarching research question of the thesis is: how is political recruitment 
within the DPNS and YNS gendered? and the sub-questions are: in what ways are gendered 
institutions and their interaction limiting and enabling women’s representation in the party? 
and how do actors within the party relate to and use institutions related to political recruitment? 
The data was analysed according to the supply and demand model of political recruitment, with 
a feminist institutional approach. The analysis shows that institutions relating to supply, but 
mainly demand, limit women’s representation within the party, as several of the institutions on 
the supply side do not seem to have gendered effects. This is in line with previous research 
which asserts demand factors as more influential (Bjarnegård 2013: 118; Evans 2008: 591-592; 
Kenny 2013: 21). There are informal institutions within the party, such as a practice that 
township level tend to only send men to trainings and activities, that limit the effect of 
institutions that are supposed to enable women’s representation. It is not easy to change existing 
demand institutions, and effects of formal institutions such as quotas therefore vary (Krook 
2010b: 161). However, women in the party have now gathered to achieve a positive change and 
increasing women’s representation. They are trying to do this through formal practical 
institutions within the party and thus on the demand side, aimed at counteracting institutions on 
both supply and demand sides.  
  
By investigating a single case my aim has been to provide an example to the field, and by 
understanding how different institutions affect the representation of women in politics, effective 
policies can be designed to counteract this. This example asserts the importance of the party as 
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a unit for intervention and also indicates that a gender quota not automatically will improve the 
representation of women. Women should be presented to the same extent as men in the political 
sphere, as there is nothing to justify the current state of affairs with men overrepresented. Also, 
since it is not clear exactly what women’s interests are, this “strengthen[s] the case for more 
women as representatives” (Phillips 1998: 224-237). Times of transitions can open up for 
gender reforms, but also cement existing norms (Kenny 2013: 45-46). As DPNS is going 
through a process of organisation itself in the country, this provides an opportunity to challenge 
existing norms. That institutions from both supply and demand sides are important and that 
changes are needed and wanted, is clear in this quote, which was the answer to a question on 
why there are fewer women than men in parliament: “party policies, that is one thing. The 
second thing, in our political history women are always in the back. They stay in the back. 
That's a main problem. We have to change that culture” (Interview 1).  
 
6.1 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The analysis gives rise to further areas of interest to be researched. As the WWC now is working 
to involve more women in the party, an interesting study would be to follow up on this work in 
relation to the next election in Myanmar in 2020. Also, since the party is planning to focus on 
some stronghold areas in this election (Interview 1), it would be interesting to see if women or 
men are placed on the seats that are most likely to win, since research has shown that it is 
common that parties place women at unwinnable seats (Kenny 2013: 97; Kenny and Verge 
2016: 360; Piscopo 2016: 490). For a deeper insight in the particular topic which is the focus 
of this thesis, a longer time in the field could have enabled an analysis of change within the 
party through an ethnographic research design. This would be interesting to investigate in this 
party and in others. Another research design that could be of value is to do a comparative study, 
as there, according to Bjarnegård and Kenny (2016: 388), is a need for more comparative 
studies concerning these aspects, “as well as more in-depth case studies that situate their 
findings in relation to the findings of other cases”. It would be interesting to look at other parties 
in Myanmar as it in some countries where one party adopted gender quotas, other parties then 
followed after, for example in Norway in the 70´s and 80´s and Germany in the 80´s (Phillips 
1998: 224-225).  
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8. APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Interview Sex Length of interview Place for interview 
Interview 1 Man 31 minutes DPNS office 
Interview 2 Woman 1 hour DPNS office 
Interview 3 Woman 55 minutes DPNS office 
Interview 4a Man 1 hour, 27 minutes DPNS office 
Interview 4b Man 1 hour, 27 minutes DPNS office 
Interview 5 Woman 1 hour, 25 minutes DPNS office 
Interview 6 Woman 35 minutes DPNS office 
Interview 7 Woman 1 hour, 13 minutes Café 
Interview 8 Man 42 minutes DPNS office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
